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 The Political Value of Disappointment among Ex-Resistance Fighters: Confronting the Grey 
Zone of Founding 
 
Maša Mrovlje 
 
This is a pre-proof version of the article published (online first) in Political Theory: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591719880626. 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper examines how the disappointment of ex-resistance fighters can illuminate the grey 
zone of founding – the ambiguity of beginning anew against the background of systemic 
violence that eludes the predominant linear visions of transition. For a theoretical framework, 
I draw on Hannah Arendt’s insights into the ambiguity of beginning anew as a practice of 
attunement that takes oppressive practices as points of departure for democratizing political 
action. I explore how the ex-resisters’ stories of disappointment can invigorate this practice, 
focusing on their ability to reorient political action towards reframing unjust relationships in a 
way that guards against systematic exclusions in the future. The paper demonstrates the 
political relevance of disappointment on the example of a South African ex-resister’s memoir, 
Pregs Govender’s Love and Courage. Govender’s narrative discloses how experiences of 
disappointment can orient the ex-resisters’ efforts to confront the complexities of founding 
obscured from the official story. 
 
Keywords: grey zone of founding, disappointment, Hannah Arendt, memoirs of resistance 
fighters, South Africa 
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Introduction 
 
The [Berlin] wall came down, everyone was pouring across and 
hugging each other […]. We had the same reaction when the apartheid 
walls came down. Then comes the morning after. Then comes the 
hangover. Realities, which during any kind of political struggle you 
don’t really have time to think about. 
Nadine Gordimer1 
 
Widespread disappointment haunting transitional societies exposes cracks in the 
predominant linear conceptions of transition.2 In these models, the founding of a new 
community is based on a transcendent principle – such as divine will, natural law or historical 
destiny – through which to go beyond past divisions and suffering. What the prevalent 
discourse tends to obscure is the grey zone of founding – the ambiguity of beginning anew 
against the background of systemic violence that cannot ultimately be expunged and will 
condition the future. Conceiving of founding in terms of a progressive movement from past 
oppression to a brighter future, linear visions of transition miss the ways that the deeply 
ingrained, systemic patterns of violence get rewritten into new discourses of oppression and 
exclusion from the public sphere.3 This paper explores how the ex-resistance fighters’ stories 
of disappointment elucidate the grey zone of founding as a predicament that comes in “the 
morning after” liberation, focusing on how the hopeful momentum of the resistance struggle 
gives way to the murky compromises of transitional politics. Delving into the political value 
of the ex-resisters’ disappointment, I contribute to the rich literature on the positive significance 
of negative attitudes for unveiling the remainders obscured from harmonious models of 
transition.4 I propose that the ex-resistance fighters’ disappointment can aptly expose the risks 
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of refusing to engage the complexities of systemic complicity, as well as the possibilities for 
beginning anew within, rather than above, contexts of violence.5 
To shed light on the grey zone of founding, the article draws on Hannah Arendt’s insights 
into the ambiguity of beginning anew as theorized in contemporary democratic theory. 
Building on these debates, my emphasis is not on issues of constitution and state organisation, 
but on the experiential reality of founding as a situated process of bringing into being 
communities of speech and action without reliance on transcendent principles of community-
formation.6 Arendt’s rejection of a transcendent principle allows her to capture the perplexity 
of founding as a distinct challenge that should not be confused with liberation from oppressive 
rule and that involves affirming the political reality of human freedom against the background 
of systemic violence. I discern how Arendt rethinks the grey zone of founding as a practice of 
attunement, which does not seek to achieve a clean break with the resilient conditions of 
oppression but takes them as points of departure for democratizing political action.  
I then explicate how the ex-resistance fighters’ stories of disappointment can kindle this 
practice of attunement. I approach the ex-resisters’ disappointment as an affective experience 
of “disjuncture” between the hoped-for-future and a disconcerting present, which reinstates the 
challenge of founding as a gap between past and future to be negotiated without pre-given 
principles. Stories of disappointment, I argue, represent reflective attempts to make sense of 
this disjuncture, driving ex-revolutionaries to re-examine their resistance ideals in light of the 
complexities of transitional moments and meaningfully respond to the persistence of systemic 
violence. I am especially interested in exploring how ex-resisters’ stories of disappointment 
can reorient political action from the “us-versus-them” mentality of the liberation struggle 
towards reframing unjust relationships in a way that guards against systematic exclusions in 
the future.7 
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Before proceeding with the argument, three qualifications are necessary. First, the notion of 
“resistance fighters,” “revolutionaries” or “resisters” denotes individuals actively involved in 
the fight against oppression over a longer period of time, firmly committed to the values of 
freedom and equality and willing to assume the risks entailed in opposing a violent regime. In 
employing this definition, my intention is not to neglect the diversity of resistance practices 
nor to reify the vision of a heroic resister. It is to focus on individuals whose sense of 
disjuncture between the resistance ideals and the disappointing present might be most 
pronounced and therefore, most revelatory of the grey zones of founding. 
Second, a turn to Arendt to think the grey zone of founding may seem counterintuitive. Her 
inquiry into the modern revolutionary tradition has been criticized for its problematic treatment 
of the social question and the European legacies of colonialism, raising important questions 
about the value of her work for addressing the persistence of systemic oppression.8 While 
acknowledging these controversies, I seek to recuperate Arendt’s efforts to grapple with the 
ambiguity of founding, which, I maintain, provide a fruitful alternative to linear visions of 
transcending the past and moving on. The aim is not to enshrine Arendt’s insights into an 
idealized conception of political action that could be unproblematically applied onto complex 
contexts of transition. It is to draw on an Arendt-inspired account of beginning anew as 
attunement so as to direct attention to how we can enhance our ability to bring to light and face 
up to the haunting histories of violence as “part of the world we have inherited.”9  
Third, my argument about the political value of ex-resisters’ disappointment is inspired by 
Arendt’s grasp of the political relevance of stories: their ability to reconcile us to the ambiguous 
character of political affairs and kindle our capacity to respond to the intricacies of the 
present.10 For Arendt, stories are particularly important in times of crisis – such as those 
engendered by profound disappointment – when our established ways of relating to the world 
are put into question and when viable courses of action need to be imagined anew.11 The 
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purpose, then, is not to offer prescriptions on how stories of disappointment can “solve” the 
grey zone of founding by evaluating them in terms of pre-given standards of reason and justice. 
On the contrary, I investigate how the ex-resisters’ narrative efforts to make sense of the 
betrayed promise of the resistance struggle can help them confront the dilemmas of political 
action in transitional moments. 
The argument proceeds as follows. The first section outlines the troubling political 
implications of linear models of transition, with a focus on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in South Africa. It takes South Africa’s transition from apartheid as a 
paradigmatic case, where the initial promise of resistance struggle ended in a widespread sense 
of failure, yet where the ambiguity of beginning anew was obscured under the linear vision of 
transition as restoration of a harmonious community. It then delineates how the South African 
ex-resisters’ disappointment is uniquely positioned to illuminate the murky reality of transition, 
opening the space for a renewed confrontation with the grey zone of founding after systemic 
violence. The second section delves into Arendt’s insights into the ambiguity of beginning 
anew as a practice of attunement. As distinct from the liberation mentality, I propose that the 
practice of attunement does not purport to provide a blueprint for how to transcend the 
remainders of past oppression. Its promise lies in retaining attention on the process of 
recognizing the dehumanizing effects of existing structures and enjoining a plurality of 
perspectives to transform unjust relations through action-in-concert. The third section explores 
the political import of the ex-revolutionaries’ stories of disappointment. I consider how they 
can trace the source of present failures to unresolved legacies of violence and orient the ex-
resisters’ attempts to face up to the systemic patterns of injustice that made past crimes possible. 
To that end, I engage in a careful reading of Pregs Govender’s memoir Love and Courage. 
Govender was a prominent anti-apartheid activist, whose post-apartheid political engagement 
was importantly shaped by her disappointments over the unfulfilled promise of the resistance 
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struggle. In engaging with Govender’s story, the aim is not to undertake a comprehensive 
overview of the sources of disappointment in South Africa. I scrutinize her narrative for its 
insights into how ex-resisters’ disappointment can illuminate the challenges and possibilities 
of beginning anew against the background of systemic violence. 
 
 
The evasion of the grey zone of founding in South Africa and the ex-resisters’ 
disappointment12 
 
Transitional justice attempts at reckoning with political violence have frequently been 
recognized as deeply political, “historical founding projects,” instituting a new conception of 
morality and lending legitimacy to the democratic political order after the horrors of the past.13 
The TRC in South Africa represents a paradigmatic case; it explicitly served as a “liminal” 
institution, a “bridge” between the past of “conflict, untold suffering and injustice” and a future 
founded on the recognition of human rights, national unity and reconciliation.14 The 
Commission arose as part of a negotiated settlement between the African National Congress 
(ANC), the leading liberation movement, and the National Party (NP), the ruling party during 
the apartheid years. To avoid the looming prospect of a bloody civil war and secure the 
conditions for democratic elections, the resistance leaders eventually embraced the possibility 
of granting amnesty to apartheid officials on condition that the perpetrators offered a full 
disclosure of their crimes. The Commission thus represented a “communicative attempt” to 
convert violence into “an occasion” for politics, entailing a constitutive appeal to all citizens to 
establish a non-racial South Africa through concerted action.15 
The Commission’s attempt to open the space for politics, however, was based on an appeal 
to the principle of “primordial” social harmony or ubuntu.16 The principle of ubuntu signalled 
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a contextual approach to transitional justice, denoting the (traditional, precolonial African or 
Christian prelapsarian) values of human interdependence and reciprocity. Yet its vision of 
human primordial inclination for communal living was invoked to imply “an anticipated future 
community” through which to transcend past injustice, thereby justifying the costs of the 
transitional compromise as a necessary, if tragic, step towards “the greatest good” of social 
harmony.17 In this way, the TRC’s resort to ubuntu was to resolve the paradox of founding as 
traditionally recognized in democratic theory. To avoid the ultimate groundlessness of a new 
beginning, theorists and political actors alike have tended to seek solace in an external principle 
– such as the allegedly united will of “the people” – to lend legitimacy to the political act of 
instituting a political community, which could otherwise only be justified as its own cause. In 
their reliance on a transcendent source, then, traditional accounts of founding demand of us to 
leap out of history, subsuming the variety of contextual perspectives under a pre-given, 
hegemonic vision of consensus.18  
The TRC’s invocation of a “we” of a restored harmonic community, in this respect, mirrors 
the prevalent tendency within the transitional justice scholarship to conceive of reconciliatory 
politics in terms of a linear, progressive movement. The coming of a brighter future is grounded 
in a troubling injunction to “remember to forget,” to engage with the painful past in order to 
successfully break with it. The freedom of a new beginning emerges once the painful memories 
of suffering and wrongdoing are mastered and relegated to the past – setting aside their 
“haunting imprint” that cannot be fully controlled and that will condition the future in 
unpredictable ways.19  
The TRC’s reckoning with the crimes of apartheid assumed the form of encouraging a 
shared moral denunciation of the evils that South Africans have inflicted upon each other, while 
abandoning the ANC’s initial commitment to exposing the systemic nature of apartheid 
injustice. The nation-building project rested on practices of atonement, redemption and the 
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“healing” of a wounded community, rather than the process of assuming responsibility for the 
conditions of systemic complicity that made the crimes possible. The Commission’s 
disembodied vision of transition, in turn, lent credence to the liberal understanding of 
democracy based on constitutionalism and rule of law, while placating the calls for a structural 
transformation of society and eschewing the need for continued inclusive practices of public 
freedom.20  
The awareness of the murky realities of founding is especially pronounced in the ex-
resisters’ experiences of disappointment. For them, the transition, far from instituting a new 
beginning, had in many ways reproduced the old patterns of systemic violence. In the 
philosophical and psychological literature, disappointment is defined as a response to violated 
expectations. If regret arises from our contrasting an unfortunate occurrence with a more 
“propitious alternative,” regardless of our anticipations, we tend to feel disappointed when a 
desirable or expected state of affairs “is snatched away by some unlikely turn of events.”21 The 
ex-revolutionaries’ disappointment expresses the main sources of disillusion in South Africa: 
the lack of a revolutionary transformation of society and continued social and economic 
inequality; the ongoing refusals (mainly among the white community) to assume responsibility 
for past injustice; and the rise of authoritarian practices, corruption and impunity in the post-
liberation politics of the ANC.22 These concrete sources of disappointment, however, also 
assume a more fundamental, existential significance.23 They concern the ex-resisters’ 
awareness of the betrayed promise of the liberation struggle to which many have devoted their 
whole lives, ensuing in a profound rupture in their sense of themselves and of their world. The 
ex-resistance fighters’ disappointment, then, could be described as an experience of 
“disjuncture” or “dis-appointment” – the sense that things “are not occurring at their appointed 
times” and “are not in their appointed places.”24  
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This understanding of ex-resisters’ disappointment is inspired by the existential-
phenomenological notion of “existential feeling” as an affective state or disposition that 
embodies a way of being in the world. Existential feeling manifests itself as a sense of reality, 
a sense of our embeddedness in an intersubjective horizon of meaning that significantly colours 
our perception of worldly possibilities.25 Disappointment as existential feeling therefore is not 
only or even primarily a mental, intentional state directed at a given (disappointing) worldly 
object nor can it be reduced to a bodily sensation. As disjuncture between the hoped-for future 
and a disconcerting present, it reflects the lived reality of enduring something “other” than what 
we had hoped, challenging our habitual ways of relating to the world and others, and 
importantly reshaping our sense of the possibilities for political action.26  
The ex-resisters’ disappointment, in this sense, manifests an embodied awareness of the 
“suspended” or “stalled” narrative of revolutionary transformation, where the present is no 
longer an end-point or a step forward in a teleological progression from past oppression to 
future freedom.27 A disappointed present is a “present imperfect,” where past violence 
continues to assert its hold on the future as a “skin” that has not been “properly sloughed” and 
where the promise of a better future assumes the guise of uncertainty, which provokes the 
“never-ending process of looking back.”28 To be sure, the experience of profound 
disappointment may easily lapse into apathy, even ressentiment, finding expression in a 
conservative nostalgia for an idealized past or a resignation to new cycles of violence.29 Yet, 
as a sense of temporal and spatial disjuncture, the ex-revolutionaries’ disappointment 
powerfully articulates the experience of inhabiting an ongoing period of “interregnum”30 
between past and future – inspiring a renewed confrontation with the grey zone of beginning 
anew after systemic violence. To provide a theoretical framework within which to engage the 
political promise of ex-resisters’ disappointment, the next section turns to Arendt’s grasp of 
the experiential reality and ambiguity of founding. 
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The ambiguity of beginning anew as a situated practice of attunement 
 
Arendt’s insights into the perplexity of founding stem from her awareness of the manifest 
failure of modern revolutions, which have managed to overthrow the oppressive regimes of the 
past but largely foundered on the challenge of instituting a new beginning. As distinct from 
liberation from oppressive rule, the challenge of beginning anew entails the constitution of a 
public space of appearance where humans can engage in action in the company of their peers 
– what Arendt called the “lost treasure” of the revolutionary tradition.31 Drawing on debates in 
contemporary democratic theory, I elaborate how Arendt confronts the ambiguity of founding 
as a practice of attunement that does not seek to transcend the residual effects of systemic 
violence, but is oriented to reframing unjust relationships through action-in-concert. 
For Arendt, every new beginning is situated in the gap between past and future, “a no-
longer” and “a not-yet,” which can no longer be bridged by the established thread of tradition 
linking events in a causal continuum of historical time.32 It is a perplexity confronting humans 
as historical, worldly beings, who are both conditioned by their broader environment and 
capable of freely responding to this environment. In the history of modern revolutions, the 
ambiguity of beginning anew stirred the persistent quest for new transcendent sources of 
authority, grounding the establishment of a body politic in either an “Immortal Legislator,” 
laws of nature or self-evident truths. Yet, as Arendt outlines in her observations on the French 
Revolution, appeals to external standards introduced into the political realm the principle of 
“absolute sovereignty,” moulding “the factual plurality” of a given people in the image of a 
unified general will of the nation.33 
Arendt’s rejection of an external principle of founding is grounded in her insights into the 
distinctively human character of politics. Politics is a sphere of action-in-concert, where a 
plurality of individuals engage in new initiatives and thereby disclose the commonness of the 
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world as an intersubjective horizon of all thought and action. The status of a speaking and 
acting being, however, is not a natural fact, but is predicated upon our recognizing each other 
as equal members of the common world and so depends on the existence of the public realm, 
where our words and deeds assume a human meaning through practices of debate and 
judgement. Any attempt to fashion the sphere of politics in line with a pre-given standard is 
politically troubling because it destroys the intersubjective fabric of the world, which can only 
emerge “in-between” a plurality of individuals speaking and acting “with” each other around 
matters of shared concern.34 For this reason, Arendt insists, the principle that is to lend 
legitimacy to the act of founding must be found in “the very act of beginning itself,” shedding 
light on the “grey area” of community-formation as a situated process of creating and 
sustaining a shared world through action-in-concert.35 Arendt’s delving into the experiential 
reality of founding, therefore, is not exhausted in attempts to unveil the hidden violence 
plaguing all prefabricated visions of community-formation.36 Determined to challenge any 
necessary ascription of new beginnings to an originary act of violence, she reorients the debate 
towards how a new beginning is enacted.37 
What Arendt praised about the course of the American Revolution was that the new 
beginning was conducted in accordance with the principle of “no-rule.” The establishment of 
the public sphere as embodied in the constitution was grounded not in freedom as sovereignty 
and rule over others, but in the power potential of “mutual promise and common deliberation,” 
in the experience of a plurality of individuals debating the terms of their political association.38 
This praise has lent Arendt to criticisms that she presupposes the conditions of freedom, which 
any act of founding must first of all enact from within situations of systemic inequality, thus 
excluding ex ante those perspectives that are not (yet) recognized as equal co-builders of the 
common world.39 The criticism however misconstrues Arendt’s notion of beginning, which, as 
Zerilli and Markell have convincingly argued, is not about “pure” rupture with what went 
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before, as if freedom were a “prepolitical condition,” reliant on a divine capacity of creation ex 
nihilo.40 Rather, the capacity of beginning anew could better be described in terms of what 
Markell calls “attunement,” an attitude of being practically engaged in and with the world. 
Attunement is not predicated upon a rational calculation of cause and effect, but involves a 
continuous practice of recognizing and making sense of events as both “irrevocable” and as 
“new points of departure” – as something that cannot be undone and as something to which we 
“could respond.”41 The Arendt-inspired rethinking of founding as a practice of attunement then 
concerns the kindling of our ability to respond to the worldly context and affirm the political 
reality of human freedom, which can only begin amidst existing relations of inequality.  
For Arendt, the greatest threat to the human capacity of freedom is “the erosion of contexts 
in which events call for responses and, thus, in which it makes sense to act at all.”42 As she 
insists throughout her oeuvre, the greatest crimes of the twentieth century were made possible 
by systemically-induced exclusions from the public sphere and the atrophy of the common 
world where we could engage in discussion about what specific events mean for us, i.e. for the 
future of our political co-existence.43 Far from presupposing the conditions of founding, she is 
attentive to the need to tackle the persistence of systemic inequality after the fall of despotic 
regimes, tracing the ultimate failure of both the French and American revolutions to their 
inability to deal with mass poverty and slavery.44 Yet she also warns against trying to resolve 
the social question on the model of liberation from oppressive rule. Reliant on instrumental 
mentality, the attitude of liberation purports to transform the plurality and unpredictability of 
human affairs in accordance to a pre-conceived blueprint, such as the given interests driven by 
the irresistible force of need. As such, this aspiration could be satisfied by “a sufficiently 
enlightened despotic government;” far from automatically leading to a realm of political 
freedom, it easily lapses into terror.45 In contrast, the “lost treasure” of the revolutionary 
tradition that Arendt wishes to reclaim is contained not in the resisters’ fight against oppression 
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per se, but in their experience of action-in-concert, which created worldly spaces of freedom 
and endowed their fight with meaning.46 
Arendt’s efforts to uphold the distinction between liberation and freedom have been read as 
another indication of her propensity to exclude social issues (and conditions of structural 
violence more broadly) from the realm of politics proper.47 The rise of the social, for Arendt, 
denotes the increasing pervasion of politics by a concern with the satisfaction of private, 
necessity-driven material needs, replacing world-disclosing action with the promotion of 
interests, management and administration.48 At times, indeed, Arendt’s divide between politics 
and the social appears to predetermine what issues can be admitted into politics, such as when 
intimating that the French revolutionary councils’ attempts to deal with the social question as 
such led to their downfall or obscuring the political meaning of the struggle against racially 
segregated schools.49 My understanding of beginning as attunement, however, builds on the 
scholarship that has developed Arendt’s insights into how the social question could be 
addressed politically, through action for the sake of the common world, rather than instrumental 
calculation.50 On this reading, the insistence on the distinct challenge of founding contains less 
a nostalgic yearning for a vision of long-lost authentic politics than an apt insight into how the 
reduction of freedom to an issue of liberation may easily reproduce the conditions of systemic 
violence.  
The Arendt-inspired account of beginning anew as attunement enjoins us to think the 
struggles for social justice as underpinned by the power potential of individuals disclosing the 
oppressive practices as objects of shared concern, solidarity and concerted action, and thus 
challenging the established visions of consensus.51 But it remains wary of the tendency to 
drown the associative dimension of such struggles under the modality of liberation, for instance 
by relegating action to realization of a set of given interests or identities conceived as 
previously subjugated substances. Counterposing to the given order the practice of constant 
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disruption, this tendency threatens to reinforce the relation of rule underlying the traditional 
accounts of community-formation.52 The crucial point then is not that envisaging action as 
instrumental calculation leads inexorably to terror, but that it abstracts struggles for justice from 
the experience of a plurality of individuals organizing themselves around a common worldly 
purpose.53 Thus, it risks not only missing how particular injustices are embedded in a broader 
field of oppressive structures, but also reducing the oppressed themselves to passive objects of 
greater causes. To be sure, the deterioration of the common world induced by systemic 
inequality may significantly obstruct the possibilities for worldly action, making the pursuit of 
power in the service of pre-given ends appear as the only way to change the world. 
Nevertheless, attempts to model the politics of founding on the liberation mentality beg the 
question of how to counter those worldly conditions that made past crimes possible and that 
continue to impede individuals’ ability to forge relations of solidarity across difference.54 
Rather than seeking to escape the constellation of agents and circumstances that make action 
meaningful, the practice of attunement finds in worldly interactions – and the intersubjective 
complicities and vulnerabilities that they foster – the occasions for democratizing and 
pluralizing spaces of action-in-concert. Beginning anew as attunement reorients attention to 
the dynamics of relating to others and granting them the status of speaking and acting beings 
precisely by illuminating the dehumanizing effects of existing structures, and inciting public 
reflection on how they could be changed. This attentiveness to the “in-between” of the world 
does not purport to offer a blueprint on how to transcend the complicities of the past in a 
sovereign move, but constantly strives to transform unjust relationships with a view to how to 
secure for each other the conditions for a properly human existence. 
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The political potential of ex-resisters’ stories of disappointment 
 
How could the ex-revolutionaries’ stories of disappointment invigorate attunement to the 
complexities of transitional moments? To reiterate, ex-resisters’ disappointment contains an 
embodied awareness of a break in the narrative of progressive revolutionary transformation, 
reinstating the challenge of founding as a gap between past and future that must be negotiated 
anew. This section explores how stories of disappointment can negotiate this gap, inciting ex-
revolutionaries to recognize the political reality of betrayed hopes as a point of departure for 
political action in the present.  
The political relevance of stories, or particular genres of stories, has often been invoked to 
confront the widespread sense of “the loss of the future” pervading the present moment – the 
perceived lack of possibilities for political action brought forth by the failed promise of modern 
revolutionary projects.55 This loss of the future seems most acute in postcolonial contexts, 
where, as Scott writes, the hopes for liberation engendered by anti-colonial struggles have 
given way to affective moods of “immobility,” “pain” and “ruin,” as if “time had found itself 
betrayed by history.”56 Scott offers a worthy attempt to confront this situation by turning to the 
resources of tragedy, which replaces progressive narratives of revolutionary transformation 
with an awareness of unpredictability and catastrophe attending revolutionary action. My 
inquiry mirrors Scott’s efforts to redirect the focus away from overcoming the constraining 
effects of colonial structures and towards considering how colonial power has shaped the 
conditions of possibility of resistant action in the first place.57 Yet I refrain from reducing 
stories of disappointment to a tragic confrontation between the resisters’ affirmation of human 
powers and the resilience of systemic violence, which risks ensnaring the revolutionary spirit 
in a discourse of inevitable failure – and entrenching the stupefying sense of “violent loss” 
occasioned by the progressive narrative’s downfall.58  
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Instead, my focus resides in exploring how ex-resisters’ efforts to grapple with their 
disappointment make use of the stories’ ability to respond to the historicity of human 
existence.59 Recognising the gap between past and future, stories can salvage past events from 
their predetermined place in a larger whole and reveal them as a living reality in our world, 
thereby kindling our awareness of the worldly conditions of freedom in the present.60 On this 
account, stories of disappointment can open up the “ever-changing time-space” of the world, 
where ex-resisters can come to terms with the possibilities of political action in the ongoing 
period of “interregnum.”61 They can trace how the persistence of oppression challenges the 
previously held visions of liberation, and how the potentials of freedom could be animated by 
unearthing the complexities of resistance in circumstances of systemic violence. This situated 
process of responding to the dilemmas of transitional moments lies at the heart of Govender’s 
memoir. I scrutinize her story to disclose how experiences of disappointment can inspire the 
ex-resisters to resituate themselves in the gap between past and future, and confront the 
systemic patterns of oppression obscured by linear visions of transition.  
 
 
In the gap between the no-longer and the not-yet 
 
Govender entered the anti-apartheid struggle through the community structures of the Natal 
Indian Congress, a mainly Indian political organisation that was an ally of the ANC. She 
participated in student boycotts, and later joined the trade union movement, all the while 
directing her energies to the emancipation of women. After the transition, she was elected into 
parliament as member of the ANC. She describes the time of the first democratic election as 
“a time of letting go of the old and entering the new.”62 Her affirmation of the human potentials 
for beginning anew is made against the background of uncertainty, lacking a secure foundation 
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of a pre-given principle that would direct the course of future change. She links the challenge 
of founding to the difficulty of transforming “old paradigms of politics” in “a democracy 
plagued by the militarised, violent and poverty-ridden legacy of apartheid.”63 Nevertheless, her 
story manifests a confidence in the possibilities opened by the negotiated transition, 
optimistically asserting that “we would go into the existing power structure and transform it.”64  
Her disappointment follows from observing how quickly the liberators themselves came to 
reproduce the unjust practices of the past. It encompasses several concrete episodes, when the 
expectations and ideals that guided her involvement in the resistance struggle were betrayed 
by the resilience of systemic complicity. These experiences had sent her “spiralling;” they 
ensued in a sense of existential, temporally and affectively experienced crisis, of the self’s 
disjuncture from the incongruous surrounding world.65 
Govender’s crucial turning point was the day she learned that the commissar of her 
underground ANC unit had asked permission to have her eliminated, not for being an apartheid 
spy, but because she was “insubordinate.” Hearing the news suffuses her lived reality like “a 
tidal wave that threatened to smash everything.”66 She conveys the change in her worldly field 
of action with the metaphor of having to “swim against this tide” of the deeply entrenched 
culture of hate, terror and fear that led the resistance fighters to emulate the apartheid 
torturers.67 Further disappointment followed when the parliament struck the infamous arms 
deal, the 1999 Strategic Defence Package that has been plagued by repeated allegations of 
corruption. For Govender, the arms deal mirrored the same values and priorities that guided 
the apartheid-era links between politicians and the white-owned business sector as well as the 
apartheid state’s concern with security – all at the expense of the pressing socio-economic 
concerns “of the majority of people who had voted us into power.”68 It represented a profound 
betrayal of the people’s trust in the new government and significantly affected her sense of the 
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possibilities for political action, leading her to wearily reflect on the parliament’s limited 
powers to influence the course of events.69 
This sense of disappointment was aggravated when, after casting the only ANC MP “no” 
vote on the arms deal, she encountered a hostile attack from an old female friend and comrade: 
“How dare you betray our organisation?” Govender felt “shaken” and struggled to “understand 
what had happened to beloved friends and comrades.”70 Finally, Govender was deeply 
disappointed by the government’s refusal to recognize and confront the AIDS epidemic, which 
for her manifested the most blatant abnegation of the values of love, courage and solidarity that 
inspired the anti-apartheid struggle. Together with the arms deal, the HIV/AIDS issue 
represented a “brick wall” – Govender resigned from her post as MP in 2002 and went in search 
of new spaces for meaningful political engagement.71  
While Govender’s dis-appointments ensue in the self’s “fragmentation” and distancing from 
the world, her narrative efforts to grapple with these painful experiences institute a journey of 
reinserting herself into history and rediscovering ways of beginning anew.72 Her story of 
disappointment aptly discloses the persistence of past violence in the present, exposing the 
inability of grand narratives of founding to account for the worldly context which saw the rise 
of political violence and which demands a responsible response. It not only reveals that the 
official vision of transition was grounded in a particular constellation of power within society, 
thus contributing to the reproduction of past practices of domination and exclusion.73 It also 
carries a deeper appreciation of the subtle ways in which “the existing structures” significantly 
suffuse the ex-resisters’ field of action, inspiring a recognition of their limits to achieve a clean 
break with the past. Govender’s experiences of disjuncture, however, do not lead her to simply 
lament the betrayal of the resistance ideals, as if all that was needed was to realize the liberation 
agenda over and above the murky situation of the transition. Her story manifests the process of 
19 
 
considering how the normalized complicities of the past condition the present vulnerabilities, 
and how the deeply entrenched relations of systemic oppression could be changed. 
 
 
Looking back: Examining the grey zones of resistance 
 
The news of her near-elimination triggers Govender to reckon narratively with the many 
grey areas during the fight against apartheid. Apart from her own experiences of undemocratic 
decision-making and practices of exclusion, she lists other cases where people were killed after 
being falsely accused of being apartheid spies. As she notes, “destructive labels” and 
“whispering campaigns” could quickly lead to “terrible retaliation” from “people who suffered 
because of real informers.”74 She acknowledges that the liberation movement operated in 
difficult circumstances, relying on secret intelligence networks that were always subject to the 
danger of infiltration by the apartheid agents. But she insists that the deep wounds inflicted by 
oppression foreground the need for “safeguards” to ensure that the new leaders do “not abuse 
[power]” and themselves begin “to speak the language of ‘elimination’.”75 As she observes, 
the resisters’ “clarity about who and what we were fighting” contributed to entrenching a sharp 
line between good and evil, between resistance and collaboration.76 On the one hand, this 
clarity allowed the resistance fighters to challenge ordinary forms of systemic complicity, such 
as her white and Indian teachers’ support for apartheid values, and persevere in a heroic stance 
of opposition against the pervasive violence of the state. On the other hand, however, it also 
led to instances of popular groups’ unthinkingly “ganging up” against individuals or opposing 
groups, while failing to challenge the ingrained authoritarian and patriarchal structures that 
made it possible for some to vilify and disqualify dissenting voices.77 
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Govender’s nuanced examination of the complexities of resistance distinguishes her story 
from an exercise in “struggle nostalgia,” a retreat into an idealized picture of the resisters’ 
heroism, self-sacrifice and endurance as consolation for the betrayed promise of freedom in the 
present.78 Nor does she seek to instrumentalize the restored memory of the resisters’ just fight 
against the evil of apartheid as a new foundation for political action in the present. To be sure, 
affective attachments to past forms of critique – often expressed in melodramatic visions of 
victimization, simplified antagonisms and heroic overcoming – can revive a strong sense of 
group identity and community of action, keeping alive the memory of past oppression and 
inspiring a continued struggle for justice.79 Yet, as Anker argues, such attachments are 
underlain by the faith that past patterns of struggle will yield a certain path towards future 
justice, while hindering the grasp of, and response to, the challenges of the present moment.80 
In this respect, Govender’s complex memories of the struggle issue a prescient reminder that 
the activists’ common fight against apartheid did not ensue in “the same values and 
understanding of power” and could not translate into a unified programme on how to rebuild 
the political community.81  
Here Govender’s story of disappointment articulates the awareness that an adequate 
response to the ambiguity of founding requires different sensibilities than those that oriented 
the liberation struggle. Her recounting of instances of corruption and intolerance during the 
fight against apartheid reveals how the current authoritarian practices and ideological divides 
are rooted in the patterns of abuse within the liberation movement. What emerges is a 
realization that any attempt to fashion a new community on the model of the us-versus-them 
mentality of liberation risks replicating the “old” understanding of power as power to rule over, 
control and exclude, which undergirds the persistence of systemic violence.82 
However, Govender also narrates instances of solidarity that were not exhausted by the 
incentive to fight the enemy, but were based on dialogue across difference, creating new forms 
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of political community on the grounds of the divisions, prejudice and fear entrenched by 
apartheid. Among the examples is the process of establishing democratic structures and 
building the non-racial alliance between the Indian and African workers within the trade union 
(Cosatu). Govender recalls leading meetings and workshops on democratic leadership, where 
she encouraged participants from different racial and economic groups to reflect on how they 
have internalized apartheid’s racist and exploitative mind-set and how these relationships could 
be reframed.83 Another example of creating worldly spaces for freedom comes forth in 
Govender’s commitment to organizing differently situated women to unite against patriarchal 
practices within the anti-apartheid movement. As she recognized, the liberation fighters shared 
with the apartheid soldiers the belief “that their job was to change the world, while women’s 
role was to take care of their children and home.”84 In response, she encouraged her women 
comrades to discuss how their own judgements often reflected the entrenched stereotypes about 
the inferior role of women and to forego internal power play in favour of acting together “to 
change their lives and the lives of their daughters.”85  
It is these experiences that Govender’s memoir reclaims for the post-apartheid era. As she 
noted upon entering parliament in 1994, the challenge was learning to use power “in new, 
creative ways,” rethinking it as a human capacity to “build” and “create,” rather than “divide” 
and “destroy.”86 By accepting “that the future cannot be fashioned from a longed-for past,” her 
story of disappointment escapes the “temporal loop” of the nostalgic longing for the betrayed 
ideals of the resistance struggle.87 Nurturing a desire to recover the lost object, such instances 
of restorative nostalgia are prone to remain caught in an impulse to bemoan the 
incommensurability between the resistance ideals and present realities. Thus, they may rouse 
the sense of being struck “out of time,” failing to respond to the changed political circumstances 
and to engage in political action at all.88  
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Govender’s memory work comes closer to a critical or reflective form of nostalgia, which 
“lingers on ruins” not to rebuild a lost home, but to make the previously hidden memories of 
the struggle speak to the perplexities of the transitional moment.89 Indeed, the political potential 
of ex-resisters’ stories of disappointment lies in turning “the pain of temporal longing” into a 
source of attunement to the present, situating past failures in the broader field of oppressive 
structures, and identifying in worldly interactions the occasions for beginning anew.90 Heeding 
this potential, Govender’s dis-appointed engagement with the past reveals how the resisters 
internalized the repressive practices of the system they opposed, while also opening the 
possibilities for resisting these dynamics and kindling the sense of the common world across 
the divides of structural injustice. 
 
 
Looking forward: Confronting the ambiguity of beginning anew 
 
Her narrative exercise in bringing the past to bear on the present guides Govender’s first 
confrontation with the ambiguity of beginning anew: her leading the Women’s National 
Coalition campaign to include women’s concerns in the new constitution of South Africa. Her 
efforts reflected the observation that freedom and power do not come “from up above, like 
manna from heaven,” but must start from the “frightening realities” of women’s inequality and 
oppression protruding from behind “the rosy talk of ‘new South Africa’.”91 Govender’s story 
articulates her understanding that women’s oppression is deeply embedded in patriarchal social 
norms and perpetuated by both men and women who resort to repressive modes of interaction 
to further their interests.92 Accordingly, the campaign refrained from viewing women as 
passive objects of government aid and tried to offset internal exclusionary tendencies that 
placed strategic pursuit of power above the concern with tackling the underlying structures of 
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inequality. It appealed to women, across the various political groupings and divisions, to 
convert the hidden issue of their oppression into a matter of public debate and participate in 
decision-making about the shape of the future political community.93 
Govender’s attempts to transform unjust relationships through action-in-concert, however, 
were often also significantly inhibited by entrenched structures of power. She observed with 
much consternation how the Reconstruction and Development Programme – the national 
economic policy aimed at a democratization of the state and the redistribution of resources – 
was replaced, with “secrecy” and “lack of debate,” by the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution strategy.94 This change beaconed a reorientation towards a neo-liberal economic 
paradigm and exacerbated the socio-economic vulnerability of women. Similarly, Govender 
drew attention to the lack of transparent decision-making about the arms deal.95 Yet her 
disappointments did not ensue in a simple denunciation of the transitional compromise that 
enabled former oppressors to retain control of the economy, or of the TRC’s proceedings that 
allowed the business sector to escape “scot-free.”96 They inspired a process of coming to terms 
with the constraining worldly conditions, leading Govender to carefully trace the ways in which 
former freedom fighters embraced the repressive understanding of power as “rule over.” 
Appeals to the moral legitimacy of the liberation movement to which the ex-resisters owe 
unconditional loyalty, she observed, manifested a form of irresponsibility towards the present. 
They conceived of the victimized population as a passive object of government policies, 
concealing the continued systemically-induced disenfranchisement of the most vulnerable 
members of society and portraying any form of dissent as corruption and betrayal.97 
As her memoir shows, the awareness of the difficulty of building solidarity in conditions of 
systemic violence strengthened Govender’s determination to stand against the elimination of 
those “most powerless, most voiceless” and to carve out the however limited spaces for 
dialogue about “the real issues of the country.”98  
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This commitment was put to a profound test with the rise of the AIDS epidemic, which was 
met with a troubling “denial of the reality of the disease.”99 Initially South Africa was leading 
the international campaign “against the greed of pharmaceutical companies,” seeking to ensure 
access to generic anti-retroviral medicine that would enable the state to provide affordable 
treatment to its poorest citizens.100 But it was not long before the then president Thabo Mbeki 
changed track, chiding those within the ANC who demanded a holistic approach to prevention 
and treatment for perpetuating racist colonial stereotypes on blacks as “natural-born 
promiscuous carriers of germs.”101 Seeking to challenge the still existing white prejudice about 
the sexuality of black people, Govender notes, Mbeki ended up reinforcing the deeply 
entrenched patriarchal notions of “sex as ‘the sin of lust’.”102 For Govender, Mbeki’s attempt 
to liberate black South Africans from past oppression clouded the understanding of the 
problem, including its embeddedness in the power dynamics of the international trade regime, 
economic inequality and gender violence.103  
Govender worked with others within the parliament’s Committee on Women to compile a 
report on the AIDS issue and pushed for open discussion. While her efforts were met with a 
campaign of silencing and threats, she kept appealing to others to “face the facts together,” 
recognize AIDS as a shared concern that reveals everyone’s interconnectedness, and “think in 
new ways” about possible solutions.104 Here, her resort to the discourse of ubuntu did not evoke 
a future vision of social harmony, but sought to remind her comrades of the commitments to 
freedom and equality that underpinned their fight against apartheid. The responsible response 
to HIV/AIDS, she claimed, had to encompass changing the patriarchal gender roles and 
relations of inequality that “are literary killing women and men.”105 Thus, Govender managed 
to open spaces for dialogue and, with the support of several comrades, influenced the 
government to pay heed to the Committee’s recommendations for AIDS treatment.106  
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While Govender’s disappointments led her to resign from parliament, they did not stymie 
her dedication to reframing unjust relationships through action-in-concert – a commitment she 
henceforth honoured through writing and direct political activism.107 The disappointed 
recognition of the worldly limits to achieve a clean break with the past, then, should not be 
understood as an ultimate abandonment of the resistance ideals and their sacrifice for some 
other good, such as societal unity. Nor does it indicate a disregard for the entrenched structures 
of inequality that significantly constrain the aspirations towards political and social 
transformation. To the contrary, as exemplified by Govender’s memoir, the ex-resisters’ stories 
of disappointment can inspire attunement to the haunting remnants of past injustice, inciting 
constant vigilance against the repetition of oppressive practices in the present. 
Such reorientation of political action is grounded in a realization that any new beginning 
cannot purport to ultimately eliminate injustice and is vulnerable to spectres of unpredictability 
and failure. The founding of political freedom is conceived not as “an end to be accomplished 
once and for all,” but as “an ongoing effort whose triumphs are always shadowed by losses.”108 
In this respect, the value of ex-resisters’ stories of disappointment resides in their ability to 
disclose past losses as sources of a kind of hope that is tempered by memories of violence and 
exclusion, and so includes an awareness of the vulnerability of the present and the uncertainty 
of the future.109 A dis-appointed attentiveness to the moments that have hindered the movement 
towards greater freedom and equality displaces overly confident visions of the past’s 
progressive overcoming, but also nurtures awareness of how things could have been done 
differently.110 A reckoning with the unfulfilled promise of the resistance struggle can reclaim 
the missed opportunities for relating to others across the divides of structural injustice and 
reveal spaces for beginning anew. The recognition of how the past exclusionary modes of 
political interaction condition the present may increase our understanding of what is entailed 
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in appealing to others as rightful members of the common world and establishing institutions 
that are responsive to political reality. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The paper sought to shed light on the political potential of the ex-resistance fighters’ stories 
of disappointment, in terms of their ability to confront the ambiguity of beginning anew against 
the background of systemic violence. On the example of Govender’s memoir, I explored how 
the ex-resisters’ stories of disappointment can support a practice of attunement to the 
unresolved legacies of oppression, reorienting political action towards reframing unjust 
relationships and structures in a way that makes past erasures less likely. 
The ex-revolutionaries’ attempts to make sense of the betrayed promise of the liberation 
struggle importantly speak to the widespread sense of disappointment plaguing transitional 
societies. In South Africa, the deep disaffection of the post-transitional generation concerns the 
continued deferral of the promised liberation. It is directed at the unresolved legacies of 
systemic violence and manifests itself in a proliferation of labour strikes and community 
protests against poor service delivery, corruption, the failures of land reform and tuition fee 
increases. These articulations of disappointment may be seen as exercises in reclaiming the 
“lost treasure” of public freedom, asserting the citizens’ right to participate in discussions about 
how to tackle lingering inequality and challenging dominant power relations. However, they 
also reflect the difficulty of beginning anew in conditions of structural injustice, tapping into 
the tactics of protest characteristic of the anti-apartheid struggle and frequently affirming 
violence as the only means of achieving progressive change.111 The warning of Nkosinathi 
Biko (the son of the murdered activist Steve Biko) seems foresighted. If we refuse to assume 
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responsibility for the legacies of historical injustice, he cautioned, the succeeding generations 
will continue the fight, only then it might be “not through the power of the pen but ‘by any 
means necessary’.”112  
The prescient political significance of ex-resisters’ stories of disappointment then lies not in 
trying to manage disappointment so that it does not develop “into emotions that more 
fundamentally challenge the political order.”113 Rather, their potential rests in their ability to 
revivify the promise of the transitional gap between no-longer and not-yet as an ephemeral 
opening for reconstituting relationships that govern the political world. The ex-resisters’ efforts 
to come to terms with past losses and failures, I argued, can reveal the possibilities of resisting 
the pernicious dynamics of systemic violence and disclose forms of political participation that 
escape the binary between revolutionary violence and status quo as the only possible 
alternatives.  
One might still object that the disappointed reorientation of political action towards the 
practice of attunement constitutes a compromising response given how the entrenched legacies 
of violence may significantly circumscribe some groups’ possibilities for worldly engagement. 
And, after all, isn’t the revolutionary spirit of freedom sooner or later doomed to dissolve and 
give way to the prevalent understanding of politics as the sphere of domination and rule? To 
be sure, a nostalgic return to the certainties of the liberation struggle can be a powerful tool for 
mobilizing new collective struggles for justice. Yet the aspirations to realize the liberation 
agenda over and above the intricacies of the transition may obscure the haunting effects of 
systemic violence and fail to transform the oppressive relations that made past crimes possible. 
In contrast, I hope to have shown how the ex-resisters’ stories of disappointment can honour 
the promise of the resistance struggle by inspiring vigilance against the repetition of 
exclusionary practices in the present. Dis-appointed engagements with the complexities of the 
resistance struggle can retrieve the experience of creating new communities of solidarity – thus 
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keeping alive the spirit that first gave rise to the fight against injustice and that frequently 
dwindles after liberation is achieved. Attunement to the unfulfilled promises of the past can 
heighten recognition of the however limited opportunities for relating to others as equal 
members of the common world and creating institutions that are hospitable to human plurality. 
Dispensing with a desire to transcend past injustice once and for all, the ex-resisters’ stories of 
disappointment can inspire a form of hopefulness that is sustained by an awareness of the 
vulnerability of the present and the unpredictability of the future. Thus understood, the 
potentials for a new beginning induced by ex-resisters’ disappointment need not remain limited 
to the historic occasions of transition. They can importantly reanimate the time of politics that 
succeeds the founding moment, bearing the constant reminder of the power potential entailed 
in forging relations of solidarity across difference and tending to the worldly in-betweens 
through practices of debate and concerted action. 
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